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Abstract
Achieving an economy-wide net-zero greenhouse gas emissions goal by mid-century in the United
States entails transforming the energy workforce. In this study, we focus on the influence of
increased labor compensation and domestic manufacturing shares on (a) renewable energy
technology costs, (b) the costs of transitioning the U.S. economy to net-zero emissions, and
(c) labor outcomes, including total employment and wage benefits, associated with the deployment
of utility-scale solar photovoltaics (PV) and land based and offshore wind power. We find that
manufacturing and installation labor cost premiums as well as increases in domestic content shares
across wind and utility-scale solar PV supply chains result in relatively modest increases in total
capital and operating costs. These small increases in technology costs may be partially or fully
offset by increases in labor productivity. We also show that solar and wind technology cost
premiums associated with high road labor policies have a minimal effect on the pace and scale of
renewable energy deployment and the total cost of transitioning to a net-zero emissions economy.
Public policies such as tax credits, workforce development support, and other instruments can
redistribute technology cost premiums associated with high road labor policies to support both
firms and workers.

1. Introduction
Net greenhouse gas emissions must approach zero in
order to stabilize the global mean temperature [1, 2].
In 2021, the Biden administration issued executive
orders committing the U.S. to achieving an economywide net-zero emissions target by mid-century [3, 4].
Several states have similarly made net-zero commitments through statute or executive order [5]. Achieving a net-zero emissions goal entails transformational
changes in the physical energy system [6–8], in addition to the energy workforce [9].
Increasingly, policy discourse has focused on
embedding social, environmental justice, and equity
goals into climate policy [10–12], including elements related to the distribution of societal costs,
risks, and benefits, such as jobs and air pollution
[13–15]. With respect to labor equity, taking the
high road refers to a collection of practices and
policies such as local hiring requirements, prevailing wage standards, unionization, gender and racial
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by IOP Publishing Ltd

equity hiring requirements, workforce development
and training, and domestic content share requirements [16]. These practices can increase and concentrate wages and other employment benefits, in addition to secure the requisite workforce and renewable
supply chain needed to meet net-zero emissions goals
and moderate both domestic and international sociopolitical influences [17]. However, the policy and
political discourse around clean energy often operates
under an assumption that there are inherent tradeoffs
between addressing climate change or maintaining
affordable electricity supplies and supporting jobs.
The aim of this to study is to quantify the relationship between high road labor practices and policies
and the cost and pace of clean energy transitions.
We focus on the influence of increased labor costs
and domestic manufacturing shares on (a) renewable energy technology costs, (b) the costs of transitioning the U.S. economy to net-zero emissions,
and (c) labor outcomes, including total employment
and wage benefits, associated with the deployment of
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utility-scale solar photovoltaics (PV) and land-based
and offshore wind power.
To evaluate the influence of high road labor
policies, we first develop bottom-up capital and operations and maintenance (O&M) cost estimates for
2020, largely based on the National Renewable Energy
Laboratory (NREL) benchmarking studies and market reports [18–31], which are indicative of U.S. costs
but do not represent regional- or project-level variation. In this bottom-up cost estimation, we confine
our scope to focus on domestic manufacturing and
direct labor associated with the following segments
of the wind and solar supply chains: production
of wind blades, towers and nacelles and wind farm
installation, and production of polysilicon, wafers,
PV cells, modules and inverters and solar PV system installation. All other raw materials and subcomponent inputs into these specific supply chain steps
(i.e. steel or aluminum for wind towers or PV racking, internal power electronics or other components
for inverters, etc) are treated as non-labor cost inputs
and we do not estimate domestic content or break
out labor costs and compensation associated with
these inputs. We modify the 2020 baseline cost estimates to reflect alternative labor cost premiums and
increased domestic content share assumptions, and
we project costs from 2020 to 2050. We then simulate
the effects of high road labor policies and practices
on least-cost pathways to achieve net-zero emissions
in the U.S. by 2050. We model alternative technoeconomic pathways using the modeling approach and
specifications developed as part of the Net-Zero America (NZA) study [6]. The NZA study implements a
macro-energy system modeling framework to select a
least-cost techno-economic pathway to achieve netzero emissions across the U.S. economy by 2050.
We use EnergyPATHWAYS, a bottom-up model of
future economy-wide electricity and fuel demand,
coupled with Regional Investment and Operations
(RIO) model, a linear programming model that combines capacity expansion with sequential hourly operations over a sampling of representative days to find
the least-cost solution for decarbonized energy supply to meet demand over time [7]. Finally, we use
the Decarbonization Employment and Energy Systems (DEERS) model to estimate employment and
wage outcomes associated with the techno-economic
pathways modeled [9].
The following sections outline the findings, and
the supplementary information (SI) (available online
at stacks.iop.org/ERL/16/124012/mmedia) provides
technical detail regarding the modeling approach.
1.1. Influence of high road labor practices and
policies on baseline renewable energy technology
costs
We estimate the following 2020 baseline capital
cost estimates: $1.20 W−1 -AC for utility-scale solar
(without tariffs), $1.30 W−1 for land-based wind,
2

$4.08 W−1 for fixed offshore wind, and $5.32 W−1
for floating offshore wind3 . See SI section 1.1 for
derivation of this baseline estimate. We then modify
these baseline renewable energy technology costs to
evaluate the influence of labor cost premiums and
increased domestic content shares, in addition to the
potential countervailing effect of productivity gains.
Labor cost premiums associated with manufacturing and installation may arise from prevailing wage
standards, unionization, job training programs, and
other high road policies and practices. Domestic labor
costs represent a small to moderate share of solar
and wind installed capital costs (17% for utility-scale
solar, 22% for land-based wind, and 10% for offshore wind) and O&M costs (32% for utility-scale
solar, 28% for land-based wind, and 16% for offshore wind). As a result, labor cost premiums associated with manufacturing and construction have a
relatively small influence on technology costs (refer
to SI figures 7 and 8). For example, a 20% increase in
domestic labor costs increases installed capital costs
for wind and solar power by 2%–4% and O&M costs
by approximately 3%–6% across technologies.
Figure 1 (and SI figures 9–11) contextualize the
sensitivity of capital and O&M costs to the wage distribution across the construction and manufacturing sectors. Wage heterogeneity is associated with,
among other factors, occupation, geography, unionization rates, industry differentiation, and firm practices. For example, unionized workers are generally
compensated at a higher wage rate than workers not
represented by a union, with average wage premiums
of 48% and 9% in the construction and manufacturing sectors, respectively; the wage premium associated with unionized workers also varies by occupation and geography [32]. Even large changes in annual
wages have a relatively small influence on installed
wind and solar project costs. For example, increasing
annual wages from the 25th to 75th percentile wage
rate for jobs in the construction sector (from $35 870
to $68 690) reported by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) increases utility-scale solar installed capital costs by 10%; similarly, increasing wages from the
non-union to the union median wage rate ($45 136–
$65 364) increases installed capital costs by 6%.
Labor policies may also be designed to induce
domestic manufacturing along wind and solar PV
supply chains. With respect to products along the
crystalline silicon PV supply chain, there is virtually no domestic manufacturing of polysilicon, ingots,

3 The following baseline technology specifications, consistent with
NREL benchmark studies [23, 24], are assumed: one-axis tracker,
100 MW, Tier 1 mono-crystalline-silicon PV modules; 200 MW
land-based wind plant comprised of 2.6 MW land-based wind turbines with a 121 meter (m) rotor diameter and 90 m hub height;
600 MW offshore wind plant comprise of 6.1 MW turbines with
fixed or floating bottom, 151 m rotor diameter, and 102 m hub
height.
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Figure 1. Sensitivity of 2018 capital costs to changes in annual wages for construction and manufacturing sector jobs for
utility-scale solar and land-based wind. For comparison, 2019 annual wage estimates for the construction and manufacturing
sector, including 25th percentile, median, average, and 75th percentile wages reported in the U.S. BLS Community Population
Survey (CPS) (dotted lines), median, union median, and non-union median wages reported in the U.S. BLS Occupational
Employment Statistics (OES) (dashed lines), and U.S. BLS OES average wage plus 20% (solid lines).

and wafers, whereas 15% of cells, 11% of modules, and 37% of inverters are produced domestically
[20, 21, 33]. Almost all cell and module imports (as
of 2020) are from Asia [22]. Increasing domestic content shares by ten percentage points (e.g. increasing
the domestic content share of cells to 25%) across the
PV supply chain (excluding upstream materials and
products such as steel and aluminum) results in a 1%
increase in average installed solar PV capital costs,
as shown in figure 2. Solar projects sourcing 100%
domestic content from across the full polysilicon PV
supply chain would have installed costs just 7% higher
than current average costs (figure 3).
The U.S. has substantial domestic manufacturing of many land-based wind products with
a domestic manufacturing share of approximately
79% (as of 2019), which is a capital cost-weighted
average across the multiple segments of the wind
product supply chain including nacelle assembly
(90%–100%), blades (40%–70%), and towers (65%–
85%) [31, 34–36]. There is no current domestic

3

manufacturing for offshore wind products. High
domestic content shares partially stem from high
international shipping costs for large wind turbine
components, making domestic products more competitive. Imports of wind products (as of 2019) come
from several different regions, with generating set
imports largely from Europe, tower imports largely
from Asia, and blades and hubs from North America, South America, Europe, and Asia [36]. We estimate that increasing the domestic manufacturing share
does not have a discernible influence on wind power
capital costs, which in part is because the price spread
between domestically-produced and imported wind
products is not well established based on available
data.
Increases in both labor costs and domestic manufacturing shares may have a compounding effect,
which is most evident in utility-scale solar. However,
even in a relatively extreme case in which compensation for all workers is increased 20% and 100% of
manufacturing is performed domestically, baseline
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Figure 2. Sensitivity of baseline capital costs to changes in domestic manufacturing shares and labor costs. Percent increases in
labor costs and percentage point increases in domestic manufacturing shares are relative to baseline estimates for average labor
cost and current domestic content circa 2020.

capital costs increase by no more than 11% for utilityscale solar, 5% for land-based wind, and 4% for offshore wind, as shown in figures 3 and 4.
Increases in labor productivity have the potential
to offset the impact of higher labor costs and domestic
manufacturing shares. For example, a 20% increase
in domestic labor costs can be offset by a countervailing increase in domestic labor productivity by
20%. Labor productivity increases can be induced
by a variety of factors. Higher labor compensation
may increase worker retention and contribute to associated productivity improvements. There is historical evidence that unionized labor is more productive [37]. Heterogeneity in firm-level productivity is
also observed. As such, while prevailing wage requirements may increase wages, total labor costs may not
increase; in states with prevailing wage laws, worksite
productivity is 14%–33% higher [38, 39].
Increasing labor productivity through automation and learning has historically contributed to
declining technology costs, making low-carbon technologies significantly more cost competitive over the
past decade. There have been historical short- and
long-term trends of increasing labor productivity
in the manufacturing sector, in addition to rapid
increases in productivity in the construction sector
associated with solar installation as well as in other
historic energy transitions such as the shale gas boom
[9, 40].
Future trends of declining renewable technology
costs entail, in part, that industries continue to economize on labor; increasing labor productivity (in
addition to increasing technological efficiency and
changing material costs) is an underlying assumption of declining technology cost projections such as
the NREL Annual Technology Baseline (ATB) that is
commonly used by policy-makers, planners, and analysts to evaluate decarbonization policies and pathways. In addition, solar and wind industries and
4

associated workforces must rapidly expand to meet
a net-zero goal by 2050 [6], and given the relatively
small size and nascence of the existing solar and wind
sectors, it is anticipated that labor productivity will
continue to increase, although the extent and pace of
productivity changes are uncertain. Technology costs
are projected to decrease over time by a much greater
magnitude (e.g. 20%–37% for utility-scale solar PV,
land-based wind 18%–25%, and 23%–32% offshore
wind from 2020 to 2030 [41]) than the potential
premium in installed project costs related to adopting high road labor practices.
1.2. Influence of high road labor practices and
policies on economy-wide net-zero transitions
We examine the influence of high road labor practices and policies on the cost and technology mix
associated with techno-economic pathways to achieve
net-zero emissions in the U.S. by mid-century. Specifically, we determine how solar and wind technology capital and O&M cost increases associated with
labor cost premiums and increased domestic manufacturing shares influence the deployment of renewables and the total investment cost of transitioning the
economy.
This work builds from the bottom-up cost breakdowns that isolate the role of labor and domestic
manufacturing in installed solar and wind project
costs outlined in the previous sections as well projections of future cost decreases. We also leverage the
techno-economic modeling framework used in the
Princeton NZA study to determine cost-optimized
energy supply pathways [6]. Here, we focus on a
cost-optimal pathway in this study, although there
are many alternative techno-economic pathways to
achieve net-zero emissions each with varying degrees
of renewables deployment and electrification rates.
We employ the same suite of modeling assumptions used in the NZA project, with the exception
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Figure 3. Utility-scale solar capital costs based on alternative labor cost premium and domestic manufacturing share assumptions.
Costs are in units of $ W−1 -ac. Green bars indicate the total capital cost premium above the baseline scenario. All estimates are
for circa 2020 and exclude tariffs for imported products.

of solar and wind technology capital and O&M cost
projections, which are modified to reflect alternative assumptions regarding labor costs and domestic
manufacturing shares. Specifically, we model two
bounding scenarios that reflect a range of assumptions: (a) labor costs and domestic manufacturing
share are consistent with 2019 NREL ATB midrange cost projections, as a baseline case, and (b)
labor costs reflect the 75th percentile of construction
and manufacturing sector wages and the domestic
5

manufacturing share of products is 100%. This
second scenario reflects a likely upper bound on the
impact of high road labor policies.
Through modeling alternative techno-economic
pathways, we show that increasing labor costs and/or
domestic manufacturing shares has minimal impact
on the deployment of solar and wind capacity. As
shown in figure 5, the pace and scale of utilityscale solar, land-based wind, and offshore wind capacity additions are approximately equivalent between
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Figure 4. Land-based wind capital costs based on alternative labor cost premium and domestic manufacturing share assumptions.
Costs are in units of $ W−1 . Green bars indicate the total capital cost premium above the baseline scenario. All estimates are for
circa 2020 and exclude tariffs for imported products.

the two net-zero transition scenarios, with a 4-fold
increase by 2030 and 18-fold increase by 2050 (relative to 2020). As depicted in figure 6, solar and
wind comprise an increasing share of electric power
generation over time across both scenarios (12%
in 2020, 86% in 2050), while fossil fuels represent a declining share (61% in 2020, <5% in 2050).
The pace of the transition will be further influenced by social and political constraints and accelerants, including potential labor shortages; there
is already evidence of hiring difficulties in solar
and wind [42, 43], portending continued employment bottlenecks in future decarbonization absent
6

effective labor organization, planning, and federal
support [9].
Even with higher labor costs, solar and wind
technologies remain a pillar of decarbonization and
cost competitive relative to other technologies. The
modeled changes in labor costs are minimal compared to other production factors contributing to
uncertainty and heterogeneity in technology cost
projections and total system costs, such as labor
productivity trends, improving system controls, and
declining material costs.
High road labor practices in the solar and
wind sectors have a small impact on the cost of
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Figure 5. Average annual solar and wind capacity additions associated with alternative U.S. decarbonization pathways to achieve a
net-zero emissions goal by mid-century. Baseline decarbonization scenario at left assumes current domestic manufacturing shares
of utility-scale solar and wind and average wages across sectors. The alternative high road scenario at right assumes that all
workers associated with utility-scale solar and wind manufacturing, installation, and O&M are paid 75th percentile wages for a
given economic sector and that 100% of the manufacturing supply chain is domestic.

Figure 6. Annual electric power generation by resource as the U.S. energy system decarbonizes to achieve a net-zero emissions
goal by mid-century. Baseline decarbonization scenario at left assumes current domestic manufacturing shares of utility-scale
solar and wind and average wages across sectors. The alternative high road scenario at right assumes that all workers associated
with utility-scale solar and wind manufacturing, installation, and O&M are paid 75th percentile wages for a given economic
sector and that 100% of the manufacturing supply chain is domestic.

transitioning to a net-zero energy system. Figure 7
shows that there is a small difference in energy supplyrelated investment costs from adopting high road
labor policies and practices in the wind and solar
sectors. The total net-present value of supply-side
investment cost over the entire transition period from
7

2020 to 2050 is $3.9 T, assuming a 2% social discount rate and average wage rates and the current
domestic manufacturing shares. As a bounding scenario, if wages increase to the 75th percentile rate and
all solar and wind products are produced domestically, the total supply-side investment costs are $4.0 T
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Figure 7. Supply-side investment costs by decade associated with alternative U.S. decarbonization pathways to achieve a net-zero
emissions goal by mid-century. Investment costs include all supply-side capital costs across the energy system (including solar and
wind capital costs). Baseline decarbonization scenario at left assumes current domestic manufacturing shares of utility-scale solar
and wind and average wages across sectors. The alternative high road scenario at right assumes that all workers associated with
utility-scale solar and wind manufacturing, installation, and O&M are paid 75th percentile wages for a given economic sector and
that 100% of the manufacturing supply chain is domestic.

from 2020 to 2050, an increase of approximately 3%.
Cumulative cost increases through 2040 are almost
imperceptible, with most of the cost increase accruing in the 2040s (see figure 7). This scenario represents a relative upper bound on the impact of a high
road labor pathway on net-zero energy system transition costs. More moderate increases in domestic content share or lower wage premiums would have correspondingly smaller cost impacts.
1.3. Influence of high road labor practices and
policies on labor outcomes under net-zero
transition scenarios
We examine the influence of high road practices and
policies on labor outcomes associated with transitioning to a net-zero emissions energy system in the
U.S. by mid-century. We use the DEERS model [9],
adopting the cost optimal techno-economic pathways
described in the previous section as input. We model
direct employment and wages associated with solar
and wind manufacturing, installation, and O&M
under different wage rate and domestic manufacturing share assumptions4 .
4 We evaluate the following four scenarios in which we modify

occupation-level wages: (a) median wages reported by the U.S. BLS,
(b) average wages reported by the U.S. BLS, (c) average wages plus

8

We show that increasing the domestic manufacturing share of solar and wind products has the potential to substantially increase domestic manufacturing employment as the U.S. transitions to a net-zero
energy system. Estimates reflect labor demand, and
domestic labor supply constraints may influence the
employment outcomes of implementing high road
labor policies. At current domestic manufacturing
shares, utility-scale solar and wind sectors support an
annual average of approximately 450 000 jobs in the
2020s, as shown in figure 8. Increasing the domestic
manufacturing share of solar and wind products by
ten percentage points across the supply chains has
the potential to support an additional 45 000 jobs
annually in the 2020s. Over the long-term, as the
U.S. energy system continues to decarbonize, an additional 95 000 jobs are supported in the 2040s, an
increase of 5% in total wind and utility-scale solar sector employment.

20%, and (d) 75th percentile wages reported by the U.S. BLS. In
addition, we evaluate the following two domestic manufacturing
scenarios in which we modify the domestic manufacturing shares
of solar and wind products: (a) current domestic manufacturing
shares, and (b) ten percentage point increase in domestic manufacturing share across all segments of the supply chain. We model
labor outcomes for the entire U.S. as well as for each state to reflect
geographic wage variation.
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Figure 8. Impact of a 10 or 20 percentage point increase relative to current domestic manufacturing share on utility-scale solar,
land-based wind, and offshore wind employment for the U.S. as the energy system decarbonizes to achieve a net-zero emissions
goal by mid-century. (a) Annual employment by economic sector, (b) annual employment by resource sector, (c) average annual
employment by resource sector and decade, and (d) net increase in average annual employment by decade.

We further evaluate the impact of increasing wage
rates. As shown in figure 9(a), approximately $25 billion in aggregate annual worker wages are generated
in the 2020s from expanding solar and wind manufacturing and electric power capacity, assuming average
occupational wage rates. Increasing the occupational
wages (or equivalent compensation) for all workers
across domestic wind and solar supply chains by 20%
has the potential to generate an additional $5 billion
in aggregate annual wages in the 2020s. An increase in
wages by 20% is equivalent to a $12 000 and $13 000
increase in average annual wages per worker for the
solar and wind sectors, respectively, as depicted in
figure 8(b). Aggregate wages paid to workers in the
wind and solar sectors increase over time as capacity expands, and wages are further augmented if a
higher share of manufactured products are produced
domestically.
1.4. Policy implications
Analysis in the previous sections, including the sensitivity of wind and solar technology costs to increased
labor costs and domestic manufacturing shares, are
neutral to the policy and market mechanisms that
9

may generate these changes. Prevailing wage or minimum wage standards in government contracting,
private sector hiring practices, unionization, business
cycles, unemployment levels, labor supply shortages,
and the relative competitiveness of domestic manufacturing can all influence labor costs and domestic
manufacturing shares in the wind and solar sectors.
Additionally, various public policies such as tax
credits, workforce development funding, and other
instruments can redistribute the costs of implementing high road labor practices and support both firms
and workers. For example, tax credits and similar public policy instruments may support higher
domestic content shares across the utility-scale solar
supply chain or minimum compensation standards in
the solar sector. Based on 2020 capital costs (assuming there are no tariffs on PV modules and cells), a 7%
investment tax credit or equivalent subsidy of similar magnitude for installed solar PV systems would
fully offset the cost of using 100% domestic content across the full supply chain. A subsidy tied to
a requirement to use only domestic cells, modules,
and inverters would need to be 4% of the cost of
installed solar PV systems to fully offset the increase
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Figure 9. Impact of domestic manufacturing share and wage premiums on wind and solar wages for the U.S. as the energy system
decarbonizes to achieve a net-zero emissions goal by mid-century. (a) Annual total wages paid by economic sector and (b)
weighted-average annual wages per job by resource sector.

in average project costs. Similarly, a 20% increase
in installation and construction labor costs would
increase the installed cost of solar PV and wind projects by only 3% and 1%, respectively, meaning that a
nominal subsidy could fully offset the impact of high
road labor practices on the cost of installing renewable energy. Wind and solar resources have generally
enjoyed public policy support at both state and federal levels. Any tax incentives or policy support to offset the costs of high road labor practices or greater
domestic manufacturing could be additive to other
policies and contingent upon minimum compensation standards or specific domestic content share,
giving flexibility to firms. The level of a future tax
credit may be adjusted to account for the changing
price spread between domestically and globally manufactured renewable energy products, in addition to
interactions with other policies such as tariffs on solar
modules that have historically had a large influence on
imports and domestic supply. Furthermore, the durability of a tax credit to support domestic manufacturing, as well as the temporal lag in growing domestic
manufacturing capacity, must be considered in the
policy design.
Tax incentives and other subsidies alone are not
necessarily sufficient to induce high road labor practices, however, given that manufacturing and development decisions are idiosyncratic, influenced by
other cost signals and non-cost factors, and vary
across product supply chains. Moreover, this study
does not model market interactions, and thus, further investigation of the impact of policy on high
10

road practices and net cost impacts for wind and solar
installations is needed.
In performing this analysis, there were some notable gaps in availability of data relevant to assessing labor costs and domestic content within the solar
and wind supply chains. Our work takes advantage
of the best available and most recent public data,
but faces limitations and uncertainties. In particular,
there were a lack of robust data regarding the price
spread between domestic and globally sourced wind
products, in addition to labor shares associated with
balance of system costs for wind and solar. Absent
robust data for several key parameters, we selectively conducted bounding analyses. As the socioeconomic impacts of energy transitions are highly salient
to policy makers and stakeholders and can potentially act as accelerants or bottlenecks for the pace
of net-zero transitions, additional effort from government statistical agencies and researchers to regularly and accurately quantify and report data on labor
costs, employment levels, domestic supply chains,
and other pertinent data would facilitate improved
decision support and policy design.
Overall, this study demonstrates that high road
labor practices and policies have a small influence
on wind and solar PV costs as well as the cost and
pace of net-zero transitions. Such practices are thus
unlikely to impede the pursuit of least-cost decarbonization strategies, while generating substantial benefits for U.S. workers and communities. Tradeoffs and
synergies between climate and social equity objectives can be real, but they are context specific and the
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magnitude of such tradeoffs requires quantification.
Within the scope and limitations of this study, we find
minimal evidence that climate and high road labor
objectives in the wind power and solar PV sectors are
in conflict.
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